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Abstract 
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was the absence of a lender of last resort in the long-term government bond markets that caused 
the fragility. We conclude that in the EMS the national central banks were weak and fragile, and the 
national governments were insulated from this weakness by the fact that they kept their own 
national currencies. In the Eurozone the roles were reversed. The national central banks that 
became part of the Eurosystem were strengthened. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Monetary System (EMS) and the Eurozone are monetary regimes that 
exhibit some similarities. The most important one derives from their fragility.  The EMS 
that existed between 1979 and 1999 was a pegged exchange rate arrangement in which 
central banks promised to convert their liabilities into a foreign currency, the German mark, 
at a fixed price. The problem of this promise was that the central banks did not have these 
marks. As a result, when investors had doubts that the central bank may be unable to make 
this conversion because of a lack of marks, there would be a run on the central bank that in 
a self-fulfilling way would generate the crisis (i.e. an inability to make the conversion).  
In the Eurozone national governments made a similar promise, i.e. to convert their 
liabilities (government bonds) into a “foreign” currency (the euro) i.e. a currency over 
which they had no control. This generated a similar fragility as in the EMS: when investors 
feared that the government would lack the euros to pay out at maturity there would be a 
run on the government, i.e. a sale of bonds that in a self-fulfilling way would generate the 
liquidity crisis that was so much feared (De Grauwe(2011)).  
In the EMS this problem was initially solved by a commitment of the Bundesbank with 
some central banks to lend them unlimited amounts of marks when their currency came 
under market pressure. This commitment arose from the fact that when a currency, say 
the lira, reached its lower limit against the mark, the Banca d’Italia was obliged to intervene, 
i.e. to buy liras in exchange for German marks. Since the Banca d’italia typically did not 
have German marks, it had to borrow these from the Bundesbank. The agreement implied 
that the Bundesbank was obliged to lend these marks to the Banca d’Italia1. Thus it can be 
said that the Bundesbank was the “backstop” of the system, or put differently, the lender of 
last resort that would provide the liquidity in times of market pressure so as to avoid self-
fulfilling liquidity crises. It turned out that this commitment had a weak credibility.  
There was the so-called Emminger letter to Helmut Schmidt, the German Chancelor, in 
which Emminger, the then president of the Bundesbank, stressed that the intervention 
                                                          
1 See the Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). See also De Grauwe (2012), p.106 and Gros and Thygesen, 
(1998). 
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commitment of the Bundesbank would be limited. This letter was leaked to the public in 
1978 and thus was publicly known information (see James(2012)). In 1992, fearing the 
inflationary consequences of its interventions, the Bundesbank withdrew its commitment 
to lend German marks to Italy, thereby precipitating the demise of the system2.  
The designers of the Eurozone were very hostile to the idea that the ECB should be the 
lender of last resort in the government bond markets. As a result, the fragility of the 
governments’ promises to convert their liabilities into euros was left unresolved until the 
liquidity crises erupted in 2010 and 2011.  
In this paper we compare the fragility of these two monetary regimes. We will do this 
mainly by analyzing the behavior of the interest rate spreads (both in the money market 
and government bond markets). We will use existing theories to explain these spreads. It 
will be shown that in both monetary regimes during crises periods the movements of some 
spreads tend to be dominated by self-fulfilling market sentiments that lead to deviations of 
the spreads from their underlying fundamentals.   
An additional objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that these self-fulfilling crises, 
as exemplified by deviating spreads,  are focused in that part of the financial system where 
there is an absence of a credible lender of last resort. In the EMS this absence of a credible 
lender of last resort was in the foreign exchange market, while in the Eurozone it was in the 
government bond markets.  
 
2. The theory 
The spread between the interest rates on two government bonds reflects the relative risk 
of holding these two bonds in the portfolios of investors. Assuming that one of the two 
bonds is a benchmark bond with zero risk (e.g. the German government bond) then the 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that interventions by NCBs in stressed foreign exchange markets were often 
financed in the EMS not only through exchange reserves but also by requesting the Treasury or the 
domestic public companies to borrow in foreign currencies, mostly German marks. This, however, 
amounted to delaying using the ultimate backstop provided by the Bundesbank. 
2
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spread between the interest rate of country i and the interest rate on the benchmark bond 
reflects the risk of holding the bond issued by country i.  
This risk can be decomposed in different sources. The first source of risk is a devaluation 
risk. This risk occurs when governments issue debt in their own currencies, as in that case 
they can decide to devalue the national currency. A second source of risk is a default risk. 
This risk occurs independently of whether countries issue debt in their own currency or in 
a different one.  It is the risk that the government will fail in servicing the debt. Thus one 
can write: 
                                                                        
where      is the interest rate spread of country i in period t,  R(.) is the risk of devaluation 
and default respectively.  
When countries issue debt in a currency, which is not their own (the member countries in 
the Eurozone) there is only a default risk. When countries issue debt in their own 
currencies (e.g. the EMS-countries) both devaluation and default risks exist.  
In principle one should be able to relate devaluation and default risks to observable 
variables. For example the devaluation risk is related to variables such as inflation 
differentials. The theory of purchasing power parity tells us that systematic inflation 
differentials between two countries that peg their currencies to each other will lead to a 
devaluation of the currency experiencing the higher rate of inflation. Thus, observable 
inflation differentials will lead to an increase in the spread reflecting a risk of future 
devaluation.  (In the next section, we discuss other relevant fundamental variables such as 
the growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio, etc.). 
The trouble with this view is that it is incomplete. Devaluations and defaults can also be 
triggered by self-fulfilling expectations (Obstfeld(1986) and De Grauwe and Ji(2012)) 3. 
These self-fulfilling expectations can force a country to devalue the currency or to default 
                                                          
3 There exist many formal theoretical models that create self-fulfilling liquidity crises. Many of these 
have been developed for explaining crises in the foreign exchange markets (see Obstfeld(1986)). 
Other models have been applied to the government debt (Calvo(1988), Gros(2011), Corsetti and 
Dedola(2011)). 
3
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even if at the time of the crisis no deteriorating movement in the fundamental variables is 
observed. Thus, one should expect that when we relate the spreads to observed 
fundamentals, there can be periods during which the spreads are deviating systematically 
from these fundamentals (see De Grauwe and Ji(2012)).   
We show an example of such a mechanism in a simplified version of the Obstfeld model. 
Figure 1 shows the costs (C) and benefits (B) of devaluation in a given country. On the 
horizontal axis we represent a current account shock (deficit). On the vertical axis the cost 
and benefit of devaluing the currency. We draw two benefit curves. Take the BU first. This is 
the benefit of a devaluation that is unexpected. This benefit increases with the size of the 
current account deficit. The benefit arises from the fact that restoring current account 
equilibrium after the shock is costly. The government will have to reduce spending and 
raise taxes, which is politically costly. Devaluation can help in restoring equilibrium with 
lesser costs and creates benefits that increase with the size of the current account deficit.  
The BE line is the benefit of devaluation when the market expects such a devaluation. The 
BE line is located above the BU line because when the market expects a devaluation it forces 
the central bank to defend the fixed rate by raising the domestic interest rate. This defence 
is costly and raises the benefits from a devaluation. Finally the cost curve is assumed to be 
a fixed, i.e. a devaluation leads to a loss of reputation that is assumed to be a fixed cost.  
It can now be seen that different types of equilibria can arise. First, when the shock is small, 
i.e.  ε < ε1 , the costs always exceed the benefits of a devaluation. As a result, the government 
has no incentive to devalue, and thus there will be no devaluation. Rational agents know 
this and thus the no-devaluation solution is model consistent.  
Second, when the shock is large, i.e. ε > ε2,  the benefits of devaluing always exceed the cost. 
The government will devalue and rational agents know this. A devaluation is the only 
possible (model consistent) equilibrium.  
Third, when the shocks is intermediate, i.e. ε1 < ε < ε2,  we obtain two possible equilibria. 
Take the shock ε’. We obtain a good (no-devaluation) and a bad (devaluation) equilibrium. 
In N we have a no-devaluation equilibrium. In N the market does not expect a devaluation. 
4
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As a result the cost of a devaluation is lower than the benefit. The government will not 
devalue. In D we have a devaluation equilibrium because in D the market expects a 
devaluation. As a result the cost of devaluation will now be lower than the benefit and the 
government will devalue.                                                                                                                   
Thus, in the range of intermediate shocks two equilibria are possible that only depend on 
the state of expectations in the market. If investors expect a devaluation the devaluation 
will occur in a self-fulfilling way. We move to D. If investors do not expect a devaluation, it 
will not occur. We move to N. This dependence of the devaluation outcome on expectations 
is the result of the fact that these expectations affect the cost benefit calculus of the 
government. 
Figure 1 :  Self-fulfilling equilibria in fixed exchange rate system and in monetary 
union  
                                       
                                                                                                                           
       B,C                                                                     
 
                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
The decision to default by a government in a monetary union can be modeled in a similar 
way as the decision to devalue in a fixed exchange rate system. We developed such a model 
in De Grauwe and Ji(2012). We can in fact use the same Figure 1 and just reinterpret the 
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variables on the axes.  On the horizontal axis we now define ε  as a solvency shock, i.e. an 
increase in the government budget deficit (produced e.g. by a recession). On the vertical 
axis C and B represent the costs and the benefits of a default by the government. The 
benefit of a default arises from the fact that by defaulting the government can avoid costly 
austerity measures (e.g. increased taxation). The benefit increases with the size of the 
solvency shock. As in the fixed exchange rate system there are two benefit lines, an 
expected and an unexpected one. The expected benefit line is above the unexpected one 
because when a default is expected the interest rate on the government debt is raised, 
thereby increasing the debt burden of the government and increasing its incentive to 
default.  
We obtain the same structure of equilibria as in the fixed exchange rate system. For 
intermediate shocks, there are two equilibria, a good one in which the government has no 
incentive to default, and thus will not do so (point N), and a bad one in which the 
government has an incentive to default, and thus will default. The outcome only depends 
on the state of expectations as in the fixed exchange rate system.  This feature will also 
allow us to design empirical tests as in the fixed exchange rate system. 
It is important to realize that the existence of two equilibria ultimately depends on the 
existence of liquidity backstops4.. Take the case of the fixed exchange rate system. Suppose 
the central bank had an unlimited stock of international reserves. In that case, when a 
speculative attack occurs (speculators expect a devaluation), the central bank would 
always be able to counter the speculators by selling an unlimited amount of foreign 
exchange. The central bank would always beat the speculators. The latter would know this 
and would not start a speculative attack. In other words they would not expect devaluation. 
In terms of Figure 1, the BE curve would coincide with the BU- curve. There would be no 
scope for multiple equilibria (see Obstfeld(1986) where this is proven formally)).  
As in the case of the fixed exchange rate regime, the existence of two equilibria in a 
monetary union is the result of the liquidity constraint faced by the national governments. 
In order to see this, suppose that these governments would not face a liquidity constraint, 
                                                          
4 This is what makes the model similar to models of bank runs. See the classic Diamond and 
Dybvig(1983) model. 
6
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i.e. they could like “stand-alone” countries be sure that the central bank (in this case the 
European Central Bank) would always provide the liquidity to pay out the bondholders at 
maturity. In that case, the government could always guarantee that the cash would be 
available. Bondholders would not be able to force a default, if the government did not want 
to default. The BE-curve would coincide with the BU-curve. There would be no scope for 
multiple equilibria. Put differently, a speculative selling of government bonds out of fear 
that the government may have insufficient cash would not be possible, if the government 
could guarantee that the cash would always be available5.  
The theory presented in the previous section leads to some testable propositions. We have 
seen that in a fixed exchange rate system and in a monetary union, movements of distrust 
vis-à-vis one country lead to an increase in the spreads (money market or government 
bonds) of that country. When such movements of distrust occur these spreads are likely to 
increase significantly without much movement of the underlying fundamentals. More 
precisely when market sentiments turn against a country the spreads are likely to exhibit 
the following features:  
 Large movements in the spreads occur over short periods. 
 Changes in the fundamental variables cannot account for the total change in the 
spreads6. Movements in the spreads appear to be dissociated from the fundamentals. 
Our aim is not to test the particular prototype model shown here. It is too simple for that. 
For example, the model does not describe the dynamics of the movements from one 
equilibrium to the other. It just shows that these different equilibria exist and that 
therefore sudden movements in the spreads driven by changes in belief can occur.  
Our model does not exclude the correlation of spreads and forward-looking variables or 
other risk relevant ratings. There has been a tendency to add lots of such variables and 
improve the fit dramatically in some empirical studies. The problem of using these 
                                                          
5 Note that the role of the lender of last resort is to deal with liquidity crises by buying government 
bonds in the secondary markets. It has nothing to do with creating inflation as a substiute for 
taxation when a fiscal shock occurs. See Sims(2012) who discusses this.  
6
 Note that we are not implying that fundamentals do not matter; in fact small movements of 
fundamentals can trigger large movements in spreads, because they trigger the fear factor (like in a 
bank run). 
7
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variables is that it may increase the explanatory power, but it has serious endogeneity 
problems. Expectations, ratings and forecasts are very much scenario dependent. In the 
case of Eurozone when the sovereign debt crisis erupts 2010-2012, all these forward-
looking variables are also likely to be influenced by the negative market sentiments 
towards the periphery Eurozone countries due to lack of lender of last resort, and therefore 
it is hard to establish precisely a causal relationship. We will not do that and instead we 
will try to account for unexplained part by introducing time variables (time dummies).  
The way we will design empirical tests of this theory is to first identify the fundamental 
variables that affect the interest rate spreads in a fixed exchange rate regime and in a 
monetary union. We will use standard theories to identify these fundamental variables. In a 
second stage we will identify periods during which the spreads systematically and in a 
serially correlated way deviate from the underlying fundamentals and relate these to 
market sentiments. Third, we will perform this analysis both at the short and the long end 
of the interest rate spreads to analyze the difference between the EMS and the Eurozone. 
As argued earlier, our hypothesis is that in the EMS the deviations in the spreads are 
concentrated at the short end that was dominated by movements in the foreign exchange 
market and an absence of a lender of last resort; in the Eurozone these deviations are 
concentrated at the long end (government bond market) where the lender of last resort 
was absent.  
3. Data and Econometric Model 
 
3.1 Data 
To test our theory on the similarities and the differences between the EMS and the 
Eurozone, we will study two samples of quarterly observations. The EMS-period is from 
1981Q1 to 1993Q4, and the Eurozone period is from 2000Q1 to 2012Q2. The countries 
included in the EMS-period are Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, France and the 
8
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Netherlands7. The countries included in the Eurozone are Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, 
Italy, Belgium, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland8.  
We are interested in both the short-term money market and the long-term government 
bond interest rates. The long-term interest is selected from the 10-year government bond 
market. The short-term money market interest rates (annualized) include the average 
interest rate of less than 1 year maturity, of three month maturity and of day-to-day 
maturity.  We calculate the spreads of these interest rates at different maturities. These 
spreads are defined as the difference between the national and the German interest rates. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the long term government bond spreads and the short-term (less 
than one year) money market spreads of the countries participating in the EMS. A 
comparison of Figures 2 and 3 leads to the following observations. First, the money market 
spreads are much more volatile than the government bond spreads (the standard deviation 
is 3.85% versus 2.60%). In addition, on average the money market spreads (3.48%) are 
higher than the government bond spreads (2.61%).  Figures 4 and 5 provide spreads with 
three-month and day-to-day maturities.  
Second, there is a gradual decline in these spreads during the EMS-period. In the first half 
these spreads are significantly higher than in the second half of the period.  This trend is 
probably relevant to the fact that in the late 1980s European countries gradually abolished 
capital controls and managed to reduce inflation rates (and the differentials in inflation). 
This difference in spreads is more pronounced for the money market spreads than for the 
government bond spreads. At the end of the period (from September 1992) the money 
market spreads surge again, but do not reach the levels reached during the first part of the 
period (except for Ireland in the day-to-day spreads). This is paradoxical. The EMS 
collapsed when the spreads were significantly lower than in the beginning of the period.   
 
                                                          
7 UK, Portugal and Spain were in the EMS for a much shorter period, therefore they are not included 
in the EMS sample. 
8 Cyprus, Estonia, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia are not included in the Eurozone 
sample. The sizes of these economies are small and some of them have been in the Eurozone for 
quite short period.   
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Data source: Datastream (Oxford Economics)  
 
 
 
Data source: Datastream (Oxford Economics)  
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Data source: Datastream (Oxford Economics)  
 
Data source: Datastream (Oxford Economics)  
 
The money market and government bond spreads during the Eurozone period are shown 
in Figure 6. The contrast with the EMS is striking. First, the volatility of the long-term 
government bond spreads is much higher than the volatility of the money market spreads. 
The latter have remained close to zero throughout the period, while the former became 
extremely volatile since 2008. Second, in contrast with the EMS-period, the spreads were 
very stable (and close to zero) in the first part of the period. Only in the second part do we 
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observe strong volatility of the government bond spreads while the money market spreads 
remain stable. 
 
 
Data source: Datastream (Oxford Economics)  
 
 
3.2  Econometric Model 
To analyze the determinants of the interest rate spreads in the EMS and the Eurozone. We 
specify the following fixed-effect econometric model.  
                                                             
where     is the interest rate spread of country i in period t,    is the constant term and     
is country i’s fixed effect. The latter variable measures the idiosyncrasies of a country that 
affect its spread and that are not time dependent. For example, the efficiency of the tax 
system, the quality of the governance, the population structure and many other variables 
that are country-specific are captured by the fixed effect.      is a set of fundamental 
variables that are specific to the two different monetary regimes.  A fixed effect model helps 
to control for unobserved time-invariant variables and produces unbiased estimates of the 
“interested variables”. 
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Figure 6. Eurozone government bond and money market 
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In the second step, following De Grauwe and Ji (2012), we introduce time dummies into the 
basic model and the specification is as follows: 
                                                                
where     is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are unrelated to 
the fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If significant, it shows 
that the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamentals forces driving the yields. It 
will allow us to evaluate the importance of fundamental economic factors and time effects. 
 
3.3  Fundamental variables 
We first identify the fundamental variables that according to prevailing exchange rate 
theories affect the spreads in a fixed exchange rate system. We then turn to the 
fundamentals model in a monetary union----the Eurozone. 
 
Fundamentals determinants in fixed exchange rate system (EMS) 
The oldest theory about the fundamental value of the exchange rate is the purchasing 
power parity theory. Although the empirical evidence for this theory remains surprisingly 
weak, especially as a theory describing the short and medium run behavior of the exchange 
rate, it has remained one of the fundamental cornerstones of the determination of the 
exchange rate (Obstfeld and Rogoff(2000)). In a nutshell it says that if a country 
experiences systematically more inflation than the country with which it pegs its currency, 
this country will have to devalue the currency to reflect this inflation differential. Rational 
agents who observe this systematic inflation differential will start anticipating the future 
devaluation. As a result the spread will be pushed up. 
Modern theories of the exchange rate have expanded on the list of fundamental variables 
that affect the exchange rate. In these modern theories the exchange rate is a variable that 
will have to adjust so as to achieve external equilibrium (current account equilibrium), see 
Williamson(1985).   
As fundamental variables we select the following quarterly data: 
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 The inflation differential between country i and Germany. 
 The current account position of country i. When country i experiences systematic 
current account deficits these will have to be corrected. This can be achieved by costly 
general expenditure reducing policies or by a devaluation. The risk that such a 
devaluation may occur will then affect the spread.  This variable is calculated as the 
ratio between the accumulated current account since 1981Q1 and the GDP level of 
country i. 
 The real growth rate of country i. Both the monetary theory of the exchange rate (see 
Sarno and Taylor(2002)) and the open economy macroeconomic models (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff(1996)) stress the importance of long term economic growth on the exchange 
rate. In general countries experiencing high growth rates will tend to have an 
appreciating currency, ceteris paribus. This effect is also akin to the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect.  
 The real effective exchange rate (CPI based) as a measure of competitiveness. This 
variable can be seen as an early indicator of future current account imbalances.  
 The debt GDP ratio: as there is a possible risk of default in the EMS, we selected the debt 
to GDP ratio as the variable that best measures this risk of future default (see next 
section where we discuss the importance if this fundamental variable as a measure of 
default risk) 
 The exchange rate change (%): The EMS was characterized by frequent but relatively 
small realignments, especially in the first half of the period. These frequent 
realignments are likely to affect expectations of future realignments. This variable aims 
to measure the importance of this effect.  
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Fundamentals determinants in monetary union (Eurozone) 
 
The set of economic and monetary variables     include the most common fundamental 
variables found in the sovereign bond literature9 are: variables measuring the sustainability 
of government debt. We will use the debt to GDP ratio. In addition, we use the current 
account position, the real effective exchange rate and the rate of economic growth as 
fundamental variables affecting the spreads. The effects of these fundamental variables on 
the spreads can be described as follows.  
 When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service 
increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an 
increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate them 
for the increased default risk.  We also add debt to GDP ratio squared. The reason of 
focusing on the non-linear relationship comes from the fact that every decision to 
default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high potential losses. Thus, as the debt to 
GDP ratio increases, investors realize that they come closer to the default decision, 
making them more sensitive to a given increase in the debt to GDP ratio (Giavazzi and 
Pagano(1990)). 
 The current account has a similar effect on the spreads. Current account deficits should 
be interpreted as increases in the net foreign debt of the country as a whole (private 
and official residents).  This is also likely to increase the default risk of the government 
for the following reason. If the increase in net foreign debt arises from the private 
sector’s overspending it will lead to default risk of the private sector. However, the 
government is likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a negative effect on 
economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues and an increase in 
government budget deficits. If the increase in net foreign indebtedness arises from 
government overspending, it directly increases the government’s debt service, and thus 
the default risk. To capture net foreign debt position of a country, we use the 
                                                          
9
 Attinasi, M., et al. (2009), Arghyrou and Kontonikas(2010), Gerlach, et al.(2010), Schuknecht, et al.(2010), 
Caceres, et al.(2010), Caporale, and Girardi  (2011), Gibson, et al. (2011), De Grauwe and Ji (2012), Aizenman 
and Hutchinson(2012), Beirne and Fratzscher(2012).  There is of course a vast literature on the spreads in 
the government bond markets in general. See for example the classic Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz(1986) and 
Eichengreen and Mody(2000). Much of this literature has been influenced by the debt problems of emerging 
economies. See for example, Edwards(1984), Edwards(1986) and Min(1998). 
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accumulated current account GDP ratio of that country. It is computed as the current 
account accumulated since 2000Q1 divided by its GDP level.  
 The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered as 
an early warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real appreciation 
will run into problems of competitiveness which in turn will lead to future current 
account deficits, and future debt problems. Investors may then demand an additional 
risk premium.  
 Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing its 
debt. The lower the growth rate the more difficult it is to raise tax revenues. As a result 
a decline of economic growth will increase the incentive of the government to default, 
raising the default risk and the spread. 
 
4. Econometric Results 
 
4.1  EMS: Long-term government bond spreads  
We start with the econometric analysis of the long-term government bond spreads in the 
EMS. A Hausman test confirms that a fixed effect model is more appropriate than a random 
effect model. The results are shown in Table 1.  As shown in the column (1), most economic 
fundamental variables are not significantly associated with the spread.  The only significant 
variable is the change in exchange rate. It indicates that the spreads in the long-term bond 
market was influenced by the regular realignments that created and endemic expectation 
of further realignments.  
It is likely that there is a structural break in the EMS period due to the fact that European 
countries decided to give up capital controls and free the capital movement across Europe 
around 1987. A Chow test confirms this view and therefore we also run separate 
regressions on the pre-1987 and post-1987 periods in Table 1.  The results suggest that 
during the pre-1987 period, the debt GDP ratio, the current account position and changes 
in exchange rate are significant variables associated with the spread; during the post-1987 
period, the inflation differential becomes a significant variable. 
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Were the long-term government bond markets in the EMS exposed to time-dependent 
market sentiment? To test this, we perform an F test of the time dummies and the result is 
shown in Table 1.  The hypothesis that there is no time effect cannot be rejected.  This test 
is illuminating and is consistent with our theory. In the EMS, each government issued debt 
in its own currency and was fully backed by the lender of last resort guarantee in the 
government bond markets. This guarantee prevented market fears of imminent defaults 
from destabilizing the national bond markets.  
 
Table 1. Long-term government bond spread (%) in EMS period  (1981Q1-1993Q4) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled Pre-1987 Post-1987 
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0292 0.0834* 0.0415*** 
 [0.0252] [0.0370] [0.0077] 
Accumulated current account/GDP ratio -0.0853 -0.2330*** -0.0337 
 [0.0482] [0.0478] [0.0384] 
Real effective exchange rate -0.0128 0.0180 0.0467* 
 [0.0478] [0.0714] [0.0191] 
Growth rate 0.0991 0.0365 0.0017 
 [0.0665] [0.1178] [0.0341] 
Inflation differences 0.2431 0.2213 0.3086*** 
 [0.1754] [0.1718] [0.0780] 
Change in exchange rate 0.2448* 0.2787*** 0.1326*** 
 [0.1165] [0.0479] [0.0339] 
Observations 364 168 196 
R2 0.6974 0.8226 0.8748 
Hausman test for fixed effect model Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Chow test for structural break Prob > F = 0.0000 
Time fixed effect F test Prob > F=0.4808 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.2 EMS: Short-term money market spreads  
The analysis in the previous section has shown that the long-term government bonds in the 
EMS were sensitive to the development of economic and monetary variables, but were not 
exposed to market sentiments like those that countries experienced in the Eurozone. In the 
end, the EMS collapsed, however, despite the fact that the long-term government bond 
spread for all the participant countries had been declining (see Figure 2). What triggered 
this breakup? We answer this question by studying the short-term money market spread 
and its determinants.   
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Table 2 presents the result of the estimation of the econometric model using the short-term 
money market spreads of less than 1 year. The regression using the pooled sample in 
Column (1) suggests that the debt to GDP ratio, the current account position and the real 
effective exchange rate are not significant explanatory variables.  
The growth rate, the inflation differentials and the change in the exchange rate are 
significant. It is noticeable that the spread is positively associated with the growth rate of 
GDP. The Balassa-Samuelson effect does not hold. The reason is likely to be that higher 
growth is related to stronger demand for liquidity and this tends to push up the short-term 
spread.  
     Table 2. Money market (less than 1 year) spreads of EMS (%) (1981Q1-1993Q4) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled Pre-1987 Post-1987 
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0306 0.0640 0.0519** 
 [0.0511] [0.0700] [0.0209] 
Accumulated current account/GDP ratio -0.0972 -0.1836 -0.0127 
 [0.1075] [0.1486] [0.0653] 
Real effective exchange rate 0.0070 -0.0305 0.1418 
 [0.0604] [0.1055] [0.0760] 
Growth rate 0.1214*** 0.1243 0.0746 
 [0.0139] [0.2041] [0.0701] 
Inflation differences 0.4947** 0.0044 0.4206*** 
 [0.1448] [0.2067] [0.0789] 
Change in exchange rate 0.3374** 0.4215* 0.2039*** 
 [0.1252] [0.1824] [0.0406] 
Observations 364 168 196 
R2 0.6196 0.7164 0.7004 
Hausman test Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Chow test Prob > F = 0.0000 
       Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The Chow test confirms a structural break in 1987.  In Table 2 (2) and (3), it indicates that 
prior to 1987 the exchange rate change is the only significant variable while during the 
post-1987, the debt to GDP ratio, inflation differences and exchange rate changes are 
significant variables.  
The regressions described in Table 2 may not be appropriate as our F-tests suggest that the 
spreads are significantly related to the time dummies. We study the short-term money 
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market spreads of three different maturities (less than one year, three month, day-to-day) 
using the fixed effect model with time dummies and the results are shown in Table 3.  After 
controlling for time dummies, we find that the three-month and day-to-day spreads are 
significantly related to the growth rate and the inflation differentials. The latter 
corroborates the empirical results of Andrew Rose and Svesson (1994).  The fundamental 
variables cease to be significant in the regression of the less than one year spread.  
               Table 3. Regression of money market spreads with time dummies in EMS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Less than one 
year 
Three 
month 
Day-to-
day 
Debt/GDP ratio 0.0224 -0.0044 -0.0220 
 [0.0580] [0.0436] [0.0255] 
Accumulated current account/GDP ratio 0.0093 0.0064 0.0461 
 [0.0920] [0.0569] [0.0372] 
Real effective exchange rate 0.0525 0.0242 0.1368 
 [0.1241] [0.0535] [0.1187] 
Growth rate 0.1590 0.1390* 0.1474** 
 [0.1205] [0.0692] [0.0498] 
Inflation differences 0.2878 0.3913*** 0.3576** 
 [0.2468] [0.0836] [0.1075] 
Change in exchange rate 0.2156 0.1178 0.3933 
 [0.1926] [0.1323] [0.3212] 
Control for time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 364 364 269 
R2 0.7138 0.8499 0.6373 
F test for no time effect hypothesis: p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0409 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: the day-to-day regression using an unbalanced sample. 
More importantly, we detect significant time dummies, which provide empirical evidence 
that a common time component affected the money market spreads across the EMS 
countries. The time dummies are plotted in Figure 7.  We detect the following features of 
the time dummies. First, significant time dummies influence the short-term money market 
spreads. This is the case in the first part of the sample period and at the very end. Thus 
during these periods the money market spreads were regularly dissociated from the 
fundamental variables. Second, the time dummies from different maturities seem to have 
some co-movement. Third, the time dummies of the short maturity spreads (day-to-day 
and 3-month) are significantly higher than those associated with the spreads of less than 1 
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year.  A striking example is to be found during the final crisis period from 1992Q2 to 1993 
Q1. One observes that the common time dummies for the day-to-day spread increases from 
3.77% to 8.63%.  
Fourth, the time dummies prior to the crisis of 1992-1993 were actually declining.  Thus 
financial markets seem to have been lulled into a belief of stability. In September 1992 a 
new speculative attack erupted, and when the Bundesbank refused to lend marks to the 
Banca d’Italia this crisis turned out to be the fatal one for the EMS.  In appendix we present 
a numerical example illustrating the central position of the Bundesbank in providing the 
necessary liquidity (German marks) allowing capital flows to occur.   
 
Source: authors’ own calculations from regressions in Table 3. 
 
Fifth, we also allow for different common time components in the core and the periphery 
countries of the EMS. The time components in the periphery countries are significantly 
higher than the time components of the core countries.  However, the time components 
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Figure 7. Time dummies  in EMS (%) (1981Q1-1993Q4) 
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appear to have some co-movement. For example, both time components surged in the crisis 
time of 1992-1993. These features are illustrated in Figure xx on the three-month spreads. 
 
 
Source: authors’ own calculations from regressions in Table 3(2) which allows for different time 
components in the core and the periphery countries. The core countries of EMS are Austria, Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and Denmark; the periphery countries of EMS are Ireland and Italy. 
 
4.3 Eurozone: long-term government bond spreads 
To compare the long-term government bond spreads in the Eurozone with those in the 
EMS, we again run regressions using a fixed effect model. After having established by a 
Hausman test that the random effect model is inappropriate, we used a fixed effect model 
to analyze the long-term bond spreads in the Eurozone. Table 4 presents regressions of the 
Eurozone countries using the proposed fixed effect model. Column (1) shows the 
regression without the time dummies using the pooled sample. The debt to GDP ratio is a 
significant variable and the relationship between the spread and the debt to GDP ratio is 
non-linear. Additionally, we find that the growth rate is negatively associated with the 
spread.  
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Table 4. Long-term government bond spreads (%) of Eurozone (2000Q1-2012Q2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled Pre-crisis Post-crisis FT model 
Debt/GDP ratio -0.0901*** -0.0114 -0.0892** -0.0968** 
 [0.0254] [0.0066] [0.0387] [0.0379] 
Debt/GDP ratio squared 0.0011*** 0.0001 0.0008** 0.0007** 
 [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Real effective exchange rate -0.0185 -0.0149*** -0.2156 0.0293 
 [0.0466] [0.0024] [0.2331] [0.0361] 
Growth rate -0.1070* -0.0008 -0.1145 -0.2058** 
 [0.0511] [0.0037] [0.0853] [0.0873] 
Accumulated current account/GDP ratio -0.0192 0.0003 -0.1845* -0.0301 
 [0.0122] [0.0016] [0.0834] [0.0186] 
Observations 500 320 180 500 
R2 0.7193 0.7088 0.8297 0.8724 
Hausman test Prob>chi2 =0.0000 
Chow test Prob > F = 0.0000 
Time fixed effect F test Prob > F=0, “no time effect” hypothesis is rejected 
Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Figure 6 suggests that a structural break occurs at the time of the financial crisis. A Chow 
test revealed that a structural break occurred in the Eurozone around the year 2008. This 
allows us to treat the pre- and post-crisis periods as separate and we show the results in 
Table 4(2) and (3). In general, the results confirm that since 2008 the markets become 
more cautious towards some key economic fundamentals which are associated with higher 
spreads. To be specific, the coefficients of the debt to GDP ratio and accumulated current 
account GDP ratio are low and insignificant prior to the crisis. In the post-crisis period 
these coefficients become larger and are statistically significant10. Moreover, the coefficient 
of the real effective exchange rate is negative prior to the crisis and this negative effect does 
not last any more.  
Finally, the results of the time dummy model are shown in Table 4(4). An F test confirms 
that there are significant time components in the regression. In order to differentiate the 
core (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy) and periphery (Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece) Eurozone groups, we assume that the time components of 
                                                          
10 Similar results are obtained by Schuknecht et al. (2010), Arghyrou and Kontonikas(2010), Borgy, 
et al., (2011), Gibson, et al. (2011), Beirne and Fratzscher(2012) and Ghosh and Ostry(2012). 
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the two groups can be different.  We show the estimated time components (associated with 
the regression results in Table 4(4)) in Figure 8.  It confirms the existence of significant 
time components that led to deviations of the spreads from the underlying fundamentals. 
This time effect is especially pronounced in the peripheral countries. This result in the 
Eurozone contrasts a great deal with the one in the EMS. In the EMS, there is always a 
national bank acting as a lender of last result in the government bond market, while in the 
Eurozone where the absence of a credible lender of last resort lead to scenarios in which 
the government bond markets can be gripped by market fear and panic. This leads to large 
spreads that cannot be justified by the economic fundamentals. 
Another noticeable result is the dynamics of the time dummies. Prior to the crisis we 
observe increasing negative time dummies in the periphery countries. The time component 
of the periphery Eurozone countries was negative and declining until 2009Q3 and when 
the crisis erupts there is a quick increase of the time dummies and these become 
significantly positive and hit 4.79% in 2012. This result suggests that prior to the crisis the 
fundamentals increasingly pointed towards the need to increase the spreads. Financial 
markets however, did not recognize this, until market sentiments abruptly changed. These 
market sentiments then overreacted and produced spreads that far exceeded those 
predicted by the deteriorating fundamentals. Thus in a way it can be said that the markets 
were wrong much of the time. Prior to the crisis they disregarded the deteriorating 
fundamentals in the periphery when pricing the government bonds. After the crisis they 
overreacted and applied spreads that were too high when compared to the underlying 
fundamentals. 
It should be noted that as the short-term money market spreads in the Eurozone (shown in 
Figure 6) were close to zero during the whole sample period there is nothing to explain. 
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that in the Eurozone the phenomenon of spreads that are 
driven away from their underlying fundamentals occurs only in the government bond 
markets . This is also where a lender of last resort was conspicuously absent, allowing fear 
and panic to dominate the government bond markets after 2010. At the short end, the 
interbank market, the ECB stood ready to intervene massively and to provide the necessary 
liquidity so as to avoid self-fulfilling crises. In appendix we present an analysis of how the 
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existence of a liquidity backstop in the money market allowed stabilizing the short-term 
spreads in the Eurozone.   
 
 
Source: authors’ own calculations from regressions in Table 4(4). 
 
4.4 Robustness check on the specification of debt to GDP ratio 
We also include squared debt to GDP ratio in the regressions of the EMS. However, in 
contrast to the regressions of the Eurozone, the non-linear relationship of debt to GDP ratio 
with the spreads does not significantly exist.  This result may relate to the fact that in the 
EMS debt level and default risk are not the main concern of investors, compared to inflation 
and depreciation risk. Therefore, in the regressions of Table 1, 2 and 3, it is safe to just use 
debt to GDP ratio as a measure of default risk.  
Apart from the debt to GDP ratio variables, we also experiment with different specifications 
about a country’s government debt situation. In the Eurozone regressions, instead of using 
debt to GDP ratio and its non-linear form, we also use the government deficit to GDP ratio 
or the year-on-year change of the debt to GDP ratio.  Neither variable is found to be 
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Figure 8. Time component in Eurozone from 2000Q1-2012Q2(%) 
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significant. The major results (including the time effects) in the Table 4 don’t change 
significantly.  
Additionally we also replace the debt to GDP ratio with the variable “fiscal space”.  The 
latter is defined as the ratio of the government debt to total tax revenues. Aizenman and 
Hutchinson(2012) argue that this is a better measure of debt sustainability than the debt to 
GDP ratio. A country may have a low debt to GDP ratio, yet find it difficult to service its debt 
because of a low capacity of raising taxes. In this case the ratio of government debt to tax 
revenues will be high, i.e. it takes a lot of years to generate the tax revenues necessary to 
service the debt.  We find evidence that there is a significant non-linear relationship (i.e. 
“fiscal space” and “squared fiscal space”) with the spreads.  The results are consistent with 
the results in Table 4 and we still detect significant time components which are surging 
radically in 2010-2012. These details can be found in the empirical study of De Grauwe, P 
and Ji Y, (2012). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our empirical results support the theory we developed about the different nature of the 
fragility of two monetary regimes, the EMS and the Eurozone. In the EMS-regime 
governments issued debt in their own currencies. Therefore, they could and did guarantee 
that the liquidity was always available to stabilize the government bond markets in times 
of crisis. This was not the case in the money markets (short end). The short-term interest 
rates (interbank interest rates) were dominated by the need to keep the exchange rate 
fixed. In times of crises (i.e. expectations of a devaluation) the exchange rate system relied 
on the intervention capacity of the central bank concerned, i.e. its capacity to convert its 
own liabilities into marks at a fixed price. This capacity in turn was limited by the 
willingness of the Bundesbank to provide the marks necessary to do the interventions. As 
argued earlier, the commitment of the Bundesbank to be a lender of last resort to the other 
central banks of the system was not fully credible, thereby triggering self-fulfilling crises 
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that led to regular devaluations. In the end when in September 1992 the Bundesbank 
refused to continue to be the liquidity backstop of the system, the EMS broke up11..  
In the Eurozone, the situation was exactly the reverse. The absence of a devaluation risk 
had the effect that spreads could only reflect default (credit risks). In the money market the 
ECB was willing to provide all the necessary liquidity to prevent major counterparty credit 
risks in the interbank market from leading to a liquidity crisis. At some point during the 
debt crisis this led to massive accumulation of Target2 liabilities in the Southern European 
countries matched by large claims in Northern Eurozone countries, which sustained the 
banking systems in these countries (see Figure 9). In the government bond market there 
was no such commitment of the ECB. As a result, fears of payment difficulties could easily 
lead to a liquidity crisis and large volatilities of the long-term bond rates. 
Thus the difference in the money market and government bond markets’ volatilities can be 
attributed to the differences in the role of the central banks in both regimes. In the EMS 
there was no credible lender of last resort in the foreign exchange markets while there was 
a lender of last resort one in each of the national government bond markets. In the 
Eurozone, there was a lender of last resort in the interbank market while there was none in 
the government bond markets.  
 
                                                          
11 It is clear that in its refusal to be the backstop of the system in 1992 the Bundesbank was very 
much motivated by a fear that its interventions would make it impossible to control the German 
money stock. 
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Data source: Euro Crisis Monitor, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrück University 
 
Another way to interpret these results is the following. The EMS fragility arose from the 
fact that the commitment to convert national currencies into the German mark at a fixed 
price could not be made credible for the following reason. Fundamentals (e.g. inflation 
differentials) were not in line with each other necessitating regular devaluations. These 
devaluations were triggered by speculative crises when investors suspected that the 
national central banks would not have enough liquidity support from the central bank that 
mattered, the Bundesbank.  
The designers of the Eurozone thought they could solve this credibility problem by 
abolishing the national currencies thereby eliminating a commitment to convert national 
currencies into marks that could not be made credible. In doing so, however, they shifted 
this credibility problem to the government bond markets. In the Eurozone, the national 
governments faced the same problem of the national central banks in the EMS, i.e. they 
made a commitment to convert their liabilities into a currency they do not have. In the 
absence of a liquidity backstop in the government bond markets this turned out to create a 
similar problem of fragility as the one that existed in the EMS. The only change that 
occurred was that the fragility was shifted from the foreign exchange markets to the 
government bond markets.  
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In a way it can be said that in the EMS the national central banks were weak and fragile, 
and the national governments were insulated from this weakness by the fact that they kept 
their own national currencies. In the Eurozone the roles were reversed. The national 
central banks that became part of the Eurosystem and supported each other 
unconditionally were strengthened.  
In 2012 the ECB decided to become the lender of last resort in the government bond 
markets, in the context of its “Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT) program. This had 
an immediate stabilizing effect and led to rapid declines in the government bond spreads in 
the Eurozone (see De Grauwe and Ji(2013)). Thus, the power of the ECB to counter market 
sentiments of fear and panic is great. This is good news for the future of the Eurozone. 
However, up to now the power of the ECB has been exerted only by announcement. It is 
clear that if market sentiments were to turn around again, the ECB would be forced to 
intervene. Intervention will be necessary if the ECB wants to avoid losing its credibility and 
its power.  
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Appendix: The mechanics of lenders of last resort in EMS and Eurozone 
 
In this appendix we present a numerical example of how a given capital outflow from one 
country (Italy) to another country (Germany) is processed in the EMS and in the Eurozone. 
We will show that in the EMS, the position of the Bundesbank is key as it provides the 
necessary liquidity (German marks) to make this capital flow possible. In the Eurozone, this 
strategic position of the Bundesbank is eliminated. In contrast, through the Target2 
payment system these capital flows are made possible without any restriction.  
We start by presenting a very simple set of balance sheets of an Italian and a German bank 
together with their respective central banks.  It presents the situation before the capital 
flow from Italy to Germany occurs.  
 
EMS and Eurozone: initial position 
 
 
  Banca d’Italia     Bundesbank 
 
 
 
DA    300       Reserve    100  DA   300     Reserve       100 
        
FA     200     Currency    400  FA   200     Currency    400 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Banco di Roma    Commerzbank 
 
 
Reserve  100      Deposit  1000  Reserve  100         Deposit  1000 
 
Loans      900                  Loans     900 
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EMS: Speculative flow of 100 from Italy to Germany 
 
  Banca d’Italia     Bundesbank 
 
 
 
DA    300       Reserve         0  DA   300     Reserve      200 
        
FA     200     Currency    400  FA   200     Currency    400 
 
       Debt BB     100  Claim BI 100 
 
 
 
 
 
  Banco di Roma    Commerzbank 
 
 
Reserve    0       Deposit  900  Reserve   200            Deposit  1100 
 
Loans   900      Loans      900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banco di Roma makes transfer of 100 to Commerzbank. This is done through drawing 
down of reserves held by Banco di Roma at Banca d’Italia. In exchange Banco di Roma 
obtains marks from Banca d’italia. The latter has borrowed these from Bundesbank and 
now has a debt of 100 vis a vis Bundesbank (Debt BB). Banco di Roma delivers these marks 
to its customer who deposits these at Commerzbank. Commerzbank obtains reserves at the 
Bundesbank.  
This transaction is only possible because the Bundesbank is willing to lend marks to the 
Banca d’Italia. But the Bundesbank is coming into conflict with its money targeting as this 
whole operation increases the money base and potentially the money stock in Germany. If 
the Bundesbank refuses to lend marks, the Banca d’italia has to stop intervening and 
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cannot keep lira/mark rate fixed. Thus the Bundesbank is lender of last resort in the 
foreign exchange market.  
Note also that the Banca d’Italia will have to act as lender of last resort for Banco di Roma 
which experiences a liquidity crisis. It will do this by open market operations, providing 
reserves and taking loans of Banco di Roma as collateral. But all this creates liquidity in the 
Italian banking system that can be used for further speculative activities, forcing the 
Bundesbank to lend additional marks. So the ultimate backstop is the Bundesbank. 
 
EMS:  Sterilization policies by Banca d’Italia 
 
 
  Banca d’Italia     Bundesbank 
 
 
 
DA    390      Reserve        90  DA   300     Reserve       200 
        
FA     200     Currency    400  FA   200     Currency    400 
 
       Debt BB     100  Claim BI 100 
 
 
 
 
 
  Banco di Roma    Commerzbank 
 
 
Reserve   90       Deposit   900  Reserve    200       Deposit  1100 
 
Loans    810 
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Eurozone: Flow of 100 from Italy to Germany 
 
 
 
  Banca d’Italia     Bundesbank 
 
 
 
DA    300       Reserve         0  DA   300     Reserve       200 
        
FA     200     Currency    400  FA   200     Currency    400 
 
       Target2     100  Target2  100 
 
 
 
 
 
  Banco di Roma    Commerzbank 
 
 
Reserve   0       Dep  900   Reserve  200  Deposit  1100 
 
Loans   900      Loans   900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The movement of 100 deposits from Italy to Germany has the same balance sheet effects. 
However, no transactions in foreign exchange market occur. It is a transfer through the 
Target payment system that is achieved automatically. Banco di Roma makes a transfer of 
euros to Commerzbank by drawing down its euro reserve position at the Banca d’Italia. 
Commerzbank increases its reserve position at the Bundesbank by 100. The Banca d’Italia 
has Target2 liability of 100 and Bundesbank Target claim. These target claims and 
liabilities are vis-à-vis the Eurosystem. It is not a loan that Bundesbank provides to Banca 
d’Italia. There is no limit to the size of these claims and liabilities. There is also no way the 
Bundesbank can refuse these claims. The lender of last resort by the Eurosystem is 
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unlimited and unconditional.  It is the Eurosystem that is lender of last resort. This lender 
of last resort occurs automatically. 
The latter is the big difference with the EMS where the liquidity backstop was conditional 
on the Bundesbank’s continued willingness to provide this facility. However, this could not 
be unlimited because it conflicted with the Bundesbank’s money targeting.  
Note that in the Eurozone the Eurosystem (through Banca d’Italia) will have to provide 
further liquidity support to Banco di Roma that is short of liquidity. It will do it the same 
way (sterilization policies) as in EMS. This may also lead to further capital flows from Italy 
to Germany, thereby increasing Target2 claims and liabilities. 
 
 
 
Eurozone:  Sterilization policies by Banca d’Italia 
 
 
  Banca d’Italia     Bundesbank 
 
 
 
DA    390       Reserve      90  DA   300     Reserve      200 
        
FA     200     Currency    400  FA   200     Currency    400 
 
       Target2     100  Target2 100 
 
 
 
 
 
  Banco di Roma    Commerzbank 
 
 
Reserve  90       Deposit  900  Reserve   200  Deposit   1100 
 
Loans   810      Loans     900 
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